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ABS'rnACT
Tbe conceptual design of the }CO Mhe sodium cooled fast breeder reactor Na-2,
presented in this paper, i5 ~le result of Joint efforts of ~le Nuclear
Research Center Karlsruhe, associated with Euratom, and the industrial group
Siemens-Interatom. The main features of the design will be described. Emphasis
will be laid upon the satety related design aspects. The resu!ts of the ana-
lysis of typical reactivity 1nsertions and coolant system failures will be
given. Tbe potential consequences of severe nuclear accidents are analysed
and the containment capabUity of the design chosen is demonstrated.
x) Work perfonned within the framework of the associat1on Euratom - Gesell-
schaft fU!' Kernforschung mbB. in the field of fast breeder development.
JUt) Institut fU!' Angewandte Reaktorphysik, Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
2IN'mODUCTION
1.1 F'ollowing the eoneeptual design study of a 1000 MWe sodiurn eooled fast
~reeder reaetor (1.2). the German fast breeder program has eoncentrated
on the development work for a m MWe prototype reaotor (3.4). 'lbe eon-
eeptual design presented in this paper i8 the result of a joint effort
of the NuelearRe8eareh Center Karlsruhe and the 1ndustrial group
Siemens-Interatam. The prototype reaetor is seheduled for eommitment in
1969 and for eompletion 1n 1973.
A rather eonservative approach 1s taken both in the satety evaluation
and engineering layout to aeoount for ineomplete knowledge in the fields
of engineering. satety and phys1es. Nevertheless. the prototype reaetor
will be typieal of a future 1000 MWe unit in most respeets and 1s espe-
eially aimed to provide the technologieal information for the construetion
of a oompetitive large seale power plant by the end of next decade.
1.2 The following main eharaeterist10s and performanoe data were chosen:
Core and Reaetor Vessel
Mixed oxide tuel pins of 6 mm O.D. and 95 cm aotive height. are
bundled in hexagonal wrapper tubes. The oo<?lant flows upward in
parallel through the two zone core end the blanket. The rating is
approx. 1 MWth/kg of fissile material and the total breeding ratio
is 1.24. 'Ibe thermal power is 730 MW to produoe a net electrieal
power of 300 MW.
Coolant System
The main ooolant system consists of three identical parallel sub-
systems with two sodlurn loops in series. A Ioop design was chosen
for the main pr1mary cooling system. Reactor outlet temperature is
5600 c yielding a steam temperature of 510oC. '!'Wo natural convection
coolant systems are provided for backup oore oooling at shutdown.
Satety
Beoause of the first-of-a-kind oharaoteristle of the prototype
reaotor a high degrae of conservatism is applled in the satety
3assessment. However, in the nuolear design no draetio modi:fication
suoh as panoaking, modular oore arrangement or speotrum softening
was employed.. 'Ihe additional saf'ety marSin will rather be gained by
add1n& conaequence l1m1ting sa:t'eguards a.,p1nst the most extreme
aooident situations. Double oontainment was pravided. 'lbe design
ensures that the integrity of the containment 18 not 1mpa1red by
acc1dents involvins nuolear, thermal or chemical reactions. Loss of
ooolant fram the core is el1m1nated even 1n the Oas8 ot a major
pipe or vessel rupture. Lang term deoay heat removal from the fuel
18 by natural conveotion. 11'1e reactor is inherently stable w1th
respect to reaot1vity perturbations.
Th18 paper w111 give oo1y abrief description of the design end will
ooncentrate on the safety U8esament of th1s reaotor.
CO" and Reaotor Vessel
2.1 'lhe tuel pm diameter is 6 um O.D. with a .38 um thick st.a1nless steel
018dcl1ng. lJhe fuel pm consists of (start.ing at the 10wer end) a 65 cm
fission gas plenum, 40 cm lower axial blanket, 95 cm aotive tuel column
and. a 40 cm upper axial blanket. 'Ihe tission gu plenum i8 located
below the core, beoause first .. due to tbe lower temperature at this point
tbere 18 a saving ot 20 cm in overall fuel element length. and secondly,
thermal stresses and bow1ng from radIal temperature gradt ents aeross the
fuel usenbly are oons1derabl.y reduoed. The potentIal release of fission
gu bUbbles after rupture cf the oanm.ng is not expeoted to cause seven
safety problems (5). A ..&red tuel density of 80 % was selected to
account for bumup swelling up to a maximum burnup of 85 000 MWd/t. In
the retC'SnCle design full pellets of 85 0/0 theoreUoal denalty were
ohosen. However. dI~ pellets or cored pellets may be used It they
show better performance. 169 fuel pms aN pos1tioned by honeycomb srlds
in hexagonal wrapper tubes cf 110 rum across flats. tIh1s tuel usembly
18 amaller than would be des1rable tor a 1000 MW plant. 'Ihe a1ze was
chosen u a. oompromise with respeot to thermal streases and. :toroes.
f'ueltnc time, improved thermal perf'ormtmCe by more aocura'te ~Justment
4of ooolant flow to power profile and available test rigs. The smaller
size tuel elements are also advantageous with respeot to the reactivity
to be handled by the fuel charge machine. The minimum distance between
fuel pins is 1.9 1m1. The core arrangement is shown on figure 1. The
inner zone of lower enr1chment fuel contains 78 fuel assemblies and 6
control elements, nemely 2 regulator rods with less than 1 $ each, 2
safety rods and 2 shirn rods. The outer zone contains 72.fuel assemblies,
6 safety rods and 6 shim rods. The central position of the core iS.reser-
ved tor speoial in-core instrumentation. The core is 95 cm high a.nd
153 cm in diameter. It 1s surrounded by a 50 cm thiok radial blanket.
2.2 Physics calculations were performed w1th one- and two-d1mensional codes,
most of which Are part of the Karlsruhe nuclear code system NUSYS. A
26 group cross section set developed at Karlsruhe was used (6). The main
physics data are listed in Table I.
Bec&uae of the uncertaint1es in the calculation of the sodium void
reactivity a maximum value of 6 $ was used in the safety analysis rather
than the calculated value of 4 $. The requirements on reactivity control
were established to &bout 40 $ to accomodate reactivity swings from cold
shutdown to full power, burnup, reactivity perturbation and shutdown
margin, lncluding one stuck rod.
2.3 The main thermal-hydraulic data are listed in Table 11. Depend1ng on
burnup, the radial blanket will contribute about 4 to 10 percent of the
total thermal power. The end of life average temperature rise 1n the
oblanket was l1m1ted to 150 C in order to prevent excessive thermal bowing.
Various refueling intervals were analysed as to their influence on
physios, thermodynamies and economy. Since it does not seem appropriate
to fix a certain fuel cycle at this time" the design is such that any
tuel cycle time between 1 year and 3 months can be realised according to
the contemporary circumstances. At present, a 6 months refueling period
1s used as a reference. In the blanket residence times will be between
4 to 15 years depending on local flux level.
2.4 Special emphasis was laid on providing a prec1se and reproducible core
geometry. In particular i t was considered essential that the core
5subassemblies are fixed radially in an upper and. lower grid plate so
that bowing of 1ndividual subassemblies will not af'f'eot the overall core
geometry. In the reference design (tig.2) the fuel element 1s supported
by the lower grid plate. 'lhe hydraulic forces of the ooolant are balanoed
by means of individual low pressure chambers below each element. The top
of the fuel assembly is positioned rad1ally in the upper arid plate which
1tself' 1s supported horizontally against a r.ig1d steel cyU.nder aurroUIl-
d1ng the radial blanket. Inward bowins of the fuel assembl1es 1s preven-
ted by wear faces attached to the outside of the wrapper tubes in order
to ensure the inherent stab1l1ty of the react1v1ty feedback.
Bes1des i ts primary function of supporting the' top of the tuel assem-
blies the upper grid plate also serves as a positive stop asainat tuel
element eJect10n fram the core follow1ng fallure of the hydraulic hold-
down. It also gu1des the contral rod drives with respect to the core to
ensure safe reactor shutdown durins horizontal eartbquake loading.
Temperature sensors a.re provided above each tuel element position for
mol11tor1ng the coolant outlet temperature of each fuel element indivi-
dually. To prevent inadvertent lifting of fuel aasemblies upon removal
of the upper grid J)late a strip off plate is prav1ded as an integral
part of the grid plate. Sweep arms are also prav1ded to check the com-
plete separation of the upper grid plate and. the fuel elements before
the upper grid plate will be swung away tor retueling.
Surrounding the radial blanket and outside of a steel neutron shield
there 1s a circular arrangement of spent fuel storage positions tor more
than one third of the core loading. 'lhe stael sh1eld serves to l1mit the
fission rate in the spant fuel storage annulus. Additiol1a.l shielding 1s
prov1ded between the tuel and the veasel to reduce the fast neutron
dosage to helow 5 • 1021 nvt during the lifet1me of the plant.
Coolant entry 1s through the bottom of the reactor vessel. '!his taci11-
tates a rather simple design of the vessel 1ntarnals eince 1t elim1na.tes
a flow divider sKirt between cold and hot sodium and the safety problems
related to i t. Bes1des there are no hot nozzles in the cold part of the
vessel wall and viae versa. The reactor vessel 1s approx. 5.2 m in d1ame-
terand 15 m high.
6For removal of spent fuel from the core and replacement wlth fresh fuel
a system of three rotatlng plugs was chosen. '!'Wo fuel transfer mecha-
nlems are instalIed on the emallest one of the three plugs for in-vesse1
fuel handllng. Transfer of fuel Md blanket elements into end out of
the reactor vessel wl11 be by aseParate mach1ne through the f'uel trans-
fer port in the large rotatlng plug. Wlth this system a high degree of
tlexlbility end short tuel handling times can be achieved.
Coolant System
'.1 The main coolant system conslsts of , identical subsystems whlch are
completely Independent except for the common point of the reactor vessel.
A sehematlc of the system is shown on fig. ,. Each subsystem oonsists of
a primary sodlum loop, a secondary sodium 100p and a steam loop in series.
Each of the secondary sodium loops ine1udes three steam generator-super-
heater Wllts and one reheater in parallel. Steam condltlons are 111 atm
o
end 510 C at the turbine stop valve. The steam generators are of the
vertioal, single wall, onee through tyPe with free sodium surf'ace and
tube sheets in the covergas • Rupture dlscs are provided for Na-r~O
reaotion pressure rellef.
'.2 The secondary sodium coolant pumps are located in the cold leg of the
secondary 100p. The sodium/sodium heat exchangers are located inside the
containment building with the primary sodium on the ahell side and the
secondary sodium on the tube side. With this design the best protection
agaInst both damage from sodium-water-reactlon pressure pulses and heat
exchanger tube rupture after a severe reaetor accident can be achieved.
Fig. 4 shows a schematic cf the pr1mary coolant system. The primary sodi-
um pumps are in the hot leg of the pr1mary loops in order to provlde
the required net positive suction head. at the pump 1nlet without the need
of pressurizing of the reactor cover gas. Thermal expansion of the plping
system Is compensated by appropriate three dlmensional layout. A thrott-
11ng valve is provided in the cold leg of ee.ch prima.ry loop in order to
facl1ltate flow control after pump ahutdown. Normal flow control wIll be
by pump speed variatIon. A pony motor ls provided for each pump wlth
backup connection to the emergency power supply. Decay heat removal from
the reactor after ahutdown will normally be by the main coolant loops.
73.3 In oase of loss of power to all pump: motors the auxiliary coolant system,
oonsisting of two identical subsystems, will provide shutdown cool1ng
of the core by natural conveot1on (f1g.4). 'lhe heat 1s transferr.ed to
a natural convection NaK loop and f1nally dumped into the air. Reverse
flow at reaotor operation in the aux1l1ary sodlum loops 18 prevented by
oheok valves.
1\1e auxiliary ooolant system i8 e8peolally designed to remain operable
even after rupture of the primary coolant system L"1oluding the reaotor
vessel and the auxillary ooolant system itself. This 1s achieved by
min1m1zins the void volumes in the reaotor oavity and in the component
oells and by providing lla-reservoir tanks which would drain by gravity,
such that the core and the entil"e primary part of the auxiliary coolant
system will always be covered by sodium.
Containment
Fig. 4 shows sohematioally the layout of the reaotor containment. Its ma.in
oharaoterist1cs are the blast shleld, a double containment barrier and full
leakage oontrol.
4.1 'lhe blast shield whioh oompletely envelopes the reaotor vessel is designed
toiaooomodate all primary effeots of the design basis aocldent. Shook
wave energies corresponding to the detonation effeot of up to 250 kg TNT
oan be absorbed by plastio deformation of structural material without
loading the oonorete walls cf the reaotor cavity. Water hammer effects
are el1minated oy avoiding a free sod.ium surfaoe below the rotatlng plug.
1\1e rotating plug end i ts holddown mechanlsm are deslgned for apressure
exoeed1ng the burst pressure of the reactor vessel. 1\1us, any pressure
bu1ldup in the vessel would be released into the reaotor oavity prior to
failure cf the plug.
4.2 1\10 concrete struoture whioh hauses the reactor and the prlmary ooolant
system forms the inner containment barrier. It 1s designed for 2 atm
intemal overpressure. 1he design leu rate 1s 50 0/0 of conta.1ned volume
per day. 'Ibo heat exohangers, namely the walls between primary end
secondary sodium, appa.rently are the most vulnerable parts cf the inner
~-----~---- ----~-------- - -- -----~-------
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containment harrier. However, we feel conf1dent that no strang shock
waves would reach the heat exohangers after hav1ng travelled &11 the way
through tbe coolant system pipil1g. Water hammer effects cannat. oocur 00-
cause tbere is no frea surfaoe 1n the heat exchanger and, tina.l.ly, the
exohangers are designed for apressure exoeeding the burst pressure of
the reaotor vessel. 'lilus, if any failure would oocur it \1ould be in a
place where it would not violate the integrity of t.b.e containment. The
atmosphere in the inner containment will be 01' low oxygen and water oon-
tent to eliminate the possibility 01' a sod1um t1re.
4.3 'lile outer oontainment barr1er 1s a oonventional low leakage stael build1ng,
appraximately 50 m h1gh and 35 m in diameter. Design oond1tions are 2 atm
o 0/overpressure, 250 C temperature and a leak rate 01' 1 0 01' contained
volume per day. '!bese values 01' design pressure and temperature are based
upon the analysis of a large pool type sodium tire inside the containment.
4.4 '!be outer containment is surrounded by a 50 cm thick concrete cylinder
as a shield aga1nst direct radiation from radioactive material. contained
in the buildi.ng followins a severe accident. 'Ibis concrete cylinder is
covered by a leaktight steel roof. '!be air pp between the steel contain-
ment and this conorete cyl1nder is conneoted to a fUtering and exh.aust
system, thus providing means to oontrol a.ny leakage 01' radioactive mate-
rial out of the rea.otor building.
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
In order to assess the safety of the design ohosen, numeraus aocident situa-
tions were analysed. In the following we sha.ll describe the plant behaviour
for some typica.l reactivity insertion accidents a.nd coolant system ma.lfunotions.
Reactivity Perturbations
5.1 In the oontral rod runaway a.ccident i t is assumed. that &11 control rods
are wi'thdrawn simultaneously at maximum design speed resulting in a reac-
tivity ramp 01' a tew cents per second. Due to the strona nept!ve tempera-
ture coefficlent 01' the COre t.b.e sodium temperature would rise at a rate
9of only 6 °C/sec which Clan aas11,. be controlled by the safety system.
Contral rod blowout by the ooolant 1s generall,. el1m1nated because the
oontrol rod we1ght exceeds the hydraul1c torees • Two fa11ures would be
required to cause control rod blowoutl fa11ure of the coolant lnlet
nozzle and 1nadvertent uncoupling end w1thdrawal of the control rod
drive shaft. 'Jlle reactivity ramp would be in the order of 5 $/sec which
can st111 be controlled by the safety system without caus1ng gross
damage to the core.
Fig. 5 shows the maximum reactlv1ty ramp which can be controlled by two
types of shutdown mechan1sms (free gravity fall and spring accelerated)
suCh that no maltins occurs e1ther in the hot spot fuel element (curves
1 and 3) or in the central fuel element without bot spots (curves 2 a.nd 4).
5.2 'D1ere was considerable concern about the potential of a refueling accident.
However, w1th the design chosen, fuel handling can be pert'ormed only if
&11 control roda are prev10usly decoupled from the1r drivea. 'lbe total
control rod \jorth of 4<J ;$ will provide abundant shutdown margin. Despite
th1s fact in the analysis 1.t was assum.ed that the core bad beeome er!tical
1na.dvertently and that a 31.4 0/0 enriched fuel element 1s dropped into
°centraJ. core pos1tion. 'lbe 1nit1al tesnperature was asaumed to be 300 c
and the flow was set to 10 % of t11e rated value. Fig. 6 shows that the
maximum fuel temperature would rise only to about lOOOoC and the sod1um
temperature would stay well below the boil1ng point. However, lt 1s anti-
c1pated that f'urther development of' suheritleality measurement teehniques
will prov1de a reliable sa.fety device so that the restr1ct1.on of maintain-
ins at least 10 % of rated flo~l during refueling will not be required.
Coolant System F'ailures
6.1 Flow bloekage in single fuel ehannels is expected to be a relatively slow
proeess. Sinee 1t 1s ant1c1pated to provide thermocouples above the outlet
of each fuel element the beginning of flow blockage 1s likely to be detee-
ted. Undetected flow blockage would lead to excess1ve sodlum temperatures
and to loeal boiling and fuel tailure. Instrumentation tor deteet10n of
sod1um bo1l1ns and tuel failure is presently under development in various
countries and the hope that at least one of the methode being developed
now will become a reliable sa.fety instrument.. 1s well Justitied.
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6.2 Loss of pump1ng power in the whole primary system would shut the reactor
down either upon low flow or upon high temperature indication. 'Ihe pri-
mary sodium temperatures would follow the curves shown on fig. 7. About
2 minutes after loss of power the two auxlliary natural convection loops
would take over the long term heat removal.
Loss of flow ev.en in &11 secoruiary coolant systems does not require imme-
diate reactor shutdown.
Accidents Involving Satety System Failure
7.1 During the early phases of the design work i t was decided that the
reactor and containment design should be based on the requirements of
a nuclear accident which might result from a severe reactor component
failure ooinciding with complete failure of the accident preventive
safeguards, such as the safety system. In the following it ia, therefore"
generally assumed that the satety system is inoperable. Sinoe the most
severe accidents would result fram fuel melting and vaporization in a
nuclear power burst the analysis has concentrated on potential reactivity
insertIons and their consequences. As a first step to such an analysis
a sImple fault propagation tree has been set up as shown on fig. 8. 'Ihe
main events which might initiate severe reactivity insertions Are the
followingt
1. Control rod eJection
2. Generation of sodium voids
3. Core meltdown.
'!bare i8 an important d1tference batween the meltdown accident and all
others • Maltdown of the dry and subcritioal coredue to fission product
heat may lead to supercritical contiguration whether a satety system is
operable or not. With allother incidents a well designed and properly
operating safety system would detect the beginning of a dangerous situa-
tion and take correct1ve actions. It Is" therefore, concluded that the
safety system and the design provisions against loss of coolant trom
the core Are of equal1y great importance in sodium coo1OO fast reactors,
and Are, theretore, to be designed to the same contidence level. We will
now come to the accident initiating events Individually.
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7.2 'l'he most reactive control element contains approx. 4.2 $ reactivity.
!his control rod is assumed to Oe ejected by bol11ng sodium after blockage
of the coolant flow through the control element and after decoupling and
withdrawal of the control rod drive. At full power the heat generation
oin the control element i8 approx. 10 /0 of the power generated by a fuel
element. The sodium would reach the bol1ing point within a few seconds •
oAesuming 300 C sodium superheat. the control rod would be ejected by a
9 atm pressure difference and might reach a velocity of 5.5 m/seo. This
would result in a reactivity insertion rate of 60 $/sec.
7 •.3 In the Na-2 design the maximum sOOium void reactivity was oalculated to
be 4 $ for a bubble volume of about 50 0/0 of' the core. However. the
safety analysis is based on a value of' 6 $. Voiding the entire core would
result in a reactivity inerease of' abOut 2 $. '!bere are pr1ncipa1ly two
mechanisms whioh might generate a I/oid 1n the sod1um of the eritieal
reaetor. First. a gas bubble in the coolant. and secondly. sod1um boi11ng.
7.4 A ps bubble in the primary coolant system might enter the core at the
rated velocity of' the sodium. It was assumed. that the gas bubble occu-
pies only the inner 2/3 of the core oross seotion where the sOO1um void
etteot 1s posit1ve. 'lhe result1ng maximum reaotivity perturbat10n 1s
55 $/eeo.
7.5 Sodium boiling in a single element contributes only up to 14 ~ reactivity•
'lheretore, in order to generate a severe reaot1vity perturbation sodium
boiling must ooour simultaneously in a great number of' fuel elements.
S1noe the sod1um v01d ettect is the most posit1ve in the oentral part ot
the core, the analys1s has conoentrated on those situations" where bol11ng
would start in the center cf the core and would propagate radially at a
high rate. 'lhe most important parameter wh10h determines the axial growth
of the bubble within the tuel elements 1s the sod1um superheat. Beoause
there i8 a great laok of experimental data in this t1eld the maximum
80dium superheat has been de11berately set at mOc (7). because above
th18 temperature the tuel cladding 1s expected to tul and to initiate
sod1um boiling by fission ps bubbles inJeoted into the sodium. The method
whioh was used to oolDpute the sodiurn ejection process is desoribed in
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another paper ot this conferenoe (7). Ae a worst oase it was assumed
that boiling starts in t.he oore midplane after instantaneous 1.oss of
flow at full power operation. Fig. 9 shows the combined. axial and ra-
dial bubble growth. 1t was assumed that sodium boiling propagates radi-
ally according to the power profile and starts at the same temperature
of 12000 C in all fuel elements. In reality due to the differences in
hot spot faotors and burnup sodium bo11ing would start sooner 1n some
elements and later in others. Thus the total react1v1ty 1nput would be
smeared. out in t1me compared to the above model. Even for the oonserva-
t1ve assumptions made here the maximum reactlvity rate was calculated
not 100 exceed 60 $/sec.
7.6 .Emphasized by the Enrico Fermi incident considerable eftort was made to
analyse the potential consequences of coolant flow blockage to iOO1vi-
dual fuel elements. Again, since the reactlvlty effect of voiding a
sinsJ,e ftiel element is rather small, only rapid propagation of this
incldent would result in severe reactlvlty perturbations. 110 was found
that after sudden complete blockage 01' a fuel element 110 takes approx.
2 to 3 seconds before the sod1um would reach the bo111ng point. If' all
fuel elements surround1ng the failed fuel element were blocked completely
by the pres8ure pulse from sodlum bol11ng, this process would propagate
at the rate of about 1 annulus every two seconds. We are confident that
the hexagonal wrapper tube of the fuel element can be designed age,lnst
the maximum pressure during bolling. However, severs deformation of these
wrapper tubes by the reoondensation pressure pulses cannot yat be dis-
counted (7). It 1s exPeQted that the eJectlon and reoondensation processes
in several fuel elements would cause considerable reactor noiae which can
be deteoted by both nuclear and acoustlc instrumentation and. that the
reactor can be shut down betore greater dam888 would ooour. Simultaneous
eJeotion of sodium out of 30 fuel elements, which would correspond to a
45 $/sec reactivity ramp, 18 considered to be a conservative eatimate of
the maximum react1vity perturbation whlch m1gh:t result fram propagation
of fuel element blockage.
7.7 Contrary to the meu.! fueled fast reactors of the first genera.tion core
meltdown i8 a very unlikely event tor the present fast reactor design
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employing eeramie fuel. As long as there is sodium in the core meltdown
ean be diseounted on the basis of the great differenee between sodium
boiling point and fuel melting point. Any serious situation would rather
lead to sodium boiling than to gross fuel meltdown. Core meltdown" there-
fore" is of eoneern only after loss of sodium. In the Na-2 reaetor loss
of sodium is eliminated by the geometrieal design of the reaetor eavity
and the heat exehanger rooms. Nevertheless i t is worthwhile to analyse
what might oeeur if the design were different. Beeause removal of sodium
in itself would have eaused a reaetivity exeursion meltdown at power is
not possible. Meltdown due to deeay heat" however" ean be envisaged after
shutdown. Due to the heat whieh is still stored in the fuel and which
is still being generated" elad melting would start very soon and would
propagate within a matter of seeonds over the whole reaetor. Fuel melting"
however" would take several minutes. If we assume that melting fuel falls
under gravity and fills up all available void volume in the eore" the
effective eore height would be reduced by about 40 em. The corresponding
reaetivity rate would be in the order of 5 $/see. However" if we assume
that the fuel would fallout of the eanning as soon as the canning melts"
then a maximum reaetivity rate of approx. 60 $/see would result. Although
the experimental evidence of irradiation experiments indieates that the
fuel column would not break down immediately after elad melting a reaeti-
vity ramp of 60 $/see was used in the analysis of the dry meltdown
aecldent.
7.8 The energy release of the nuclear exeursion was ealculated aceording
to the Bethe-Tait theory (8). A one-dimensional spherieal model of the
Na-2 reaetor eore was used. In all eases where there is still sodium in
the reactor a modifieation was applied to the one-dimensional model to
account for the fact" that the fuel eladding and the hexagonal wrapper
tubes of the fuel elements can prevent radial eore disassembly. It was
assumed that this disassembly takes place only in the axial direction.
Consequently a reaetivity ramp of 60 $/see would produee about the same
energy in the wet eore as it does in 1;he dry eore" although the Doppler
coefficient of the wet core is about twiee as good as in the dry core.
About 500 MWsec of destruetive energy might be released in both cases.
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7.9 In most of the nuclear acc1dents 1nvest1gated there 1s still sod1um in
the core or in the environment of the ccre end the potential destructive
energy release cf the excursion may be increased due to subsequent vapo-
rlzatlon of sooium(9). An upper 11mit for the potential mechanlcal energy
of a fuel-aod1um interaction was determlned on the basis of lnstantaneous
heat transfer from the vaporized and molten f'uel to the liquid sodlum
and lsentropio expansion of' the f'uel and sod.ium vapor mixture. Fig. 10
shows the maximum meohanioal work whioh can be done by the sOO1um vapor
bubble as a funotion of the initial f'uel temperature and the f'inal pres-
sure to whioh the bubble will expand. For an average tuel temperature
of' 4OOQoK whioh i8 typioal for a severe nuclear excurs10n of' the Na-2
reactor, the potential meoha.nical werk of' an expansion down to 20 atm
i8 about 200 MVlsec per tonne fuel ot' 1000 MWseo total. In this we have
a8Sumed that the sodium vapor bubble does destructive work only a.bove
20 atm, because th1s i8 the design pressure of' the reaotor cavity•
7.10 In the nuolear power burst most of the fuel is melted and a significant
portion 1s vaporized resulting in the release of' radioactlve fission
produots and fuel isotopes. Iodine and Plutonium are of' speoial signif'i-
oanoe in this oontext (lO)beoause they represent the most important
hazard potential to the environment.
Assumptions made to oalculate the leakage of the radioactive material
through the oontainment barriers were very oonservative. Following the
nuolear exoursion and the tuel sodium interaction a great part of' the
primary sodium was assumed to be spread into the primary oontainment
heating up its inert atmosphere to the sOOium temperature. For the resul-
ting overpressure of less than 3 ata the time dependence of gas leakage
fram the inner containment into the outer containment and fram there
into the atmosphere was caloulated assuming pressure decay due to leakage
only. No oredit was taken f'ram the fact that the containment atmosphere
will cool down during the acoident.
'Ibe release of ra.dioactive material from the fuel was conservat1vely
o 0
estimated by assuming 100 /0 for the noble gases, 10 /0 tor the halo-
gens, 50 % tor the volatile solids and 1 % for the solids. These
numbers are rather pess1mist1c in view of the fact that the flssion pro-
ducts ~ the fuel isotopes released are 1n elose contaat with sodium
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betore being dispersed in the inner conta1mlent atmosp.here 0 Due to the
good trapping capability of sodium the release fract10ns SllOuld be
lover than assumed in these oalculations. Because the f'uel will be
d8stroyed very rapidly by a f'ast nuclear exoursion the released. frac-
tions of radioaetive material were assumed to become airborne in the
inner containment 1mmediately after the power burst. Decrease of the
aet1vity concentration in the containment atrnosphere was aocounted for
accordins to an exponantial law of' the plate out with half' times of'
1 h for the halogens end volatile solids and 10 h tor the solid material.
'Ibe weather cond1tions during the accident were cons1dered to be constant.
In the c.a.Iculatiol1 a ground level release aocompanied with inversion
condltions were assumed. No credit was taken from the decontam1nat1na
eftect of the exhaust and fUtering system which controls the air gap
around the steel containment. 'lhe accident doses given below were cal-
culated f'or the desiSn leu rates of 50 Val. 0/0 / day for the pr1mary
and of 0.5 Val. % / day f'or the seoondary containraent barriere
Design Basis Accident Dosest (500 m. downwind.. inversion)
'l'1me of Exposure (h) 2 8
Bone Dose (rem) 0.98 22
'1hyro1d Dose (rem) 0.17 0.55
'lhe numbers show that the bane dose 1s the governing radiation burden.
'Ibis i8 due to the high inventory of Plutonium 1n the reactor whioh
together with the Strontium isotopes adds considerably to the bone dose.
'Ibe interrelation between the containment system and tbe various isoto-
pes released during a large acoident is discussed in more detail 1n
another paper (10) of this conf'erence.
7.11 It can be concluded that the double containment system applied to the
Na-2 design provides a su1table measureto reduce the radiation hazard
to a tolerable level 1f ws use the 25 rem accident dose as a yardst1ck.
It should be noted that the usumpt10ns made in these calculations are
rather pess1mistio. We be11eve that with mors and better information
about the important parameters of actlv1ty release in fast reactor aooi-
dents the aoo1dent doses reported will be lowered oonsiderably.
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Furthermore" 1f plant s1tes near o1t1es or areas of high populat1on
densities should be seleoted" add1tional reduotion of a.oo1dent doses
aan be aohieved by a.aoount1ng for the ooncrete ayl1nd.er around the
outer oontainment ehell aB an add1tional barr1er. Venting the air pp
between the outer oontainment ahell and the eonerete cy11nder to an
exhaust staok would lead to better aotiv1ty dispers10n 1n the atmos-
phere. Add1ns fUters to the exhaust system would even more reduee the
rad1at1on burden to the env1ronment 1n ease of an aoe1dent. From these
stud1es 1t oan be eoneluded that the Na-2 plant has the eapao1ty of
follow1ns the eaonomical site requirements without hazard to the publie.
CONCLUSIONS
From the safety analysis of the Na-2des1gn a number of conolus1ons can be
drawn. wh10h may serve as a guide11ne for future work. Concentrated effort
1s requ1red in the fields of aoeident analysis and development of engineered
safeguards.
8.1 Greatest emphasis is to be plaoed on development and demonstration of
re11ability of 811 er1tioal reaotor oomponents and aooident preventive
safeguaI'ds" suoh as to prevent the ooourrenoe of any situation wh10h might
lead to release of aotive material. Real1zation of the prinoiples of d1-
vers1ty and redundanoy in the ent1re safety system and in the emergenoy
oooling equipment appears to be the appropr1ata methode Suooess in th1s
ares. would e11m1nate the problems of the two following paragraphs •
8.2 The possib11ity of a severe nuolear acoident is extremely remote" but
the present state of teohnology and analysis leaves some doubt as to
whether they oan be ruled out entirely. Until suff'ioient oonfidenoe has
bean established in the safety of sodium oooled breeder reactors. 1t
appears appropr1ate to aooount for suoh severe aocident$ in the design
as was done in the Na-2 ooneept.
The oontainment of the Na.-2 reaotor would be oapable to acoomooate the
potential oonsequenees of severe nuolear aoo1dents without hazard to the
publie.
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8.3 Because of the pessimistic estimates marle in every single step of the
safety analysis. the design of the consequence limiting safeguards
incorporates a high degree of conservatism. Further theoretical and
experimental investigation of fast sodium cooled reactor safety will
likely lead to more appropriate and more economic solutions.
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Table I
Physics Data
Core height
Core diameter
Core compos1tion
tuel
sod1um
steel
Crit1cal mass
fissile
fertile (core)
fertile (blanket)
Pu-enriohment
inner zone
outer zone
Pu-compos1tion (as loaded)
Pu 239
Pu 240
Pu 241
Pu 242
Internal conversion ra~10
Total breeding ratio
Prompt neutron lifetime
Ef'teotive delayed neutron fraction (1 $)
React1vity coeft1cients
tuel (expansion only)
olad
structure
sod1um
dkDoppler constant ( T dT )
with sodium
w1thout sodium
95 cm
153 cm
29.8 0;0
49.6 0;0
20.6 0;0
773 kg
?ß67 kg
26800 kg
21.2 0;0
31.4 0;0
75 0;0
22 0;0
2.5 0;0
0.5 0;0
0.55
1.24
3.9 • 10-7 sec
3.0 • 10-3
-9.45 • 10.6 grd-1
+0.37 • 10-6 grd-1
-6 -1-31.~4 • 10 grd
+0.37 • 10.6 grd-1
-3.76 • 10-3
-1.76 • 10-3
Reaotivity effeots
oold shutdoltn - full power
burnup s\'ling (16000 r·1Wd/to)
sodium void (maxirm..l1'T')
One outer zone fuel elerne;lt loaded into
the center of inner zone
One oontrol rod (maximum)
All shirn rods
All saf'ety rods
8.5 $
9 $
4 $
2.5 $
4.2 $
20 $
20 $
'l'able II
Thermal Hyciraulios Data of the Core
Power
total
oore aüd axial blanket, high,!low burnup
radial blanket, high/low burnup
Pea.king factor
radial
axial
Rod power
core average
maximum bot spot
Temperature
reaotor inlet
reactor outlet
core outlet, high/low burnup
radial blanket,outlet, high/low burnup
oladding hat spot
fuel hat spot
eoolant velocity maximl.ml
Cera pressure drop
7;0 lJM
660/700 MW
70/YJ MW
1.20
1.24
270 W/om
540 W/om
380 oe
560 oe
564/576 oe
5YJ/44O °c
690 oe
2700 oe
5 rn/sec
2.1 at
1 Subassembly Inner Zone
2 Subassembly Outer Zone
3 Control Rod
4 Inslrumenlion Position
5 Breeder Element
6 Neutron Shield
7 Spent Fuel Storage
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